Fire Detection Tradeoffs as a Function of Vehicle Parameters by Meyer, Marit E. et al.
Fire Detection Tradeoffs as a Function of Vehicle Parameters 
David L. Urban1, Daniel L. Dietrich2, John E. Brooker3, Marit E. Meyer4, and Gary A. Ruff5 
NASA Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio 44135 
Fire survivability depends on the detection of and response to a fire before it has produced 
an unacceptable environment in the vehicle. This detection time is the result of interplay 
between the fire burning and growth rates; the vehicle size; the detection system design; the 
transport time to the detector (controlled by the level of mixing in the vehicle); and the rate at 
which the life support system filters the atmosphere, potentially removing the detected species 
or particles. Given the large differences in critical vehicle parameters (volume, mixing rate 
and filtration rate) the detection approach that works for a large vehicle (e.g. the ISS) may not 
be the best choice for a smaller crew capsule. This paper examines the impact of vehicle size 
and environmental control and life support system parameters on the detectability of fires in 
comparison to the hazard they present. A lumped element model was developed that considers 
smoke, heat, and toxic product release rates in comparison to mixing and filtration rates in 
the vehicle. Recent work has quantified the production rate of smoke and several hazardous 
species from overheated spacecraft polymers. These results are used as the input data set in 
the lumped element model in combination with the transport behavior of major toxic products 
released by overheating spacecraft materials to evaluate the necessary alarm thresholds to 
enable appropriate response to the fire hazard. 
Nomenclature 
?̇?𝑖,𝐼 =  particle generation rate per unit volume or moles per unit volume generated in module I 
VI = Volume of module (I) 
?̇?𝐸𝐶𝐿𝑆𝑆 =  Volume flow for ECLSS system  
Xi,I =  Mole Fraction of species I or number density of particulate species, i, in module I 
αi =  Fraction of ECLSS flow that is HEPA filtered  
σg = Geometric Standard Deviation 
I. Introduction and Background 
IVEN the very small market for spacecraft smoke detectors and the absence of test data in spaceflight conditions,
spacecraft smoke detectors have been developed based on experience and standards from residential and aviation
systems. These terrestrial systems will be briefly reviewed to provide background on the choices available for 
spacecraft systems. Beginning in the mid 1970’s the sale of residential smoke detectors expanded rapidly from 50,000 
per year to over 12 million per year. This was largely the result of substantial price reductions in that decade and 
public appreciation of data showing their positive impact on fire survivability [1]. At the time the only technology that 
provided a useful lifetime of 15 to 25 years was radioisotope-based ionization detectors. More recently, with the advent 
of semiconductor light sources, light scattering devices have become more prevalent [2]. As established by the 
National Fire Code (NFPA 72) [3] the performance of residential smoke detectors must be in compliance with 
Underwriters Laboratory (UL) 217/268 [4, 5]. 
These UL requirements specify a broad acceptable range for minimum sensitivity and several test fires the sensor 
must detect. Specifically, when exposed to grey smolder smoke and black hydrocarbon smoke, the detector must alarm 
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within the range of 0.5 to 4.0 percent obscuration per foot. Having fallen within this broad range, the detector must 
also detect three reference fires (shredded paper, wood fire, and a heptane/toluene pool fire). In practice, manufacturers 
trade detection sensitivity versus false alarms while staying within the broad sensitivity specification. Obscuration per 
foot is a measurement basis that is not commonly used elsewhere in the aerosol community. Since it depends strongly 
on the concentration, refractive index and size properties of the smoke, it does not provide direct information about 
the quantity of smoke present for an arbitrary smoke, making it difficult to compare smoke detector specifications to 
fundamental aerosol properties. Nevertheless, due to the historical importance of the UL standard to the detector 
community, it is commonly used to describe detector sensitivity.  
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) utilizes a different approach, establishing detection requirements that 
emphasize performance in scenarios consistent with the target locations: bathrooms and cargo bays [6]. Because of 
the wide range of humidity and suspended particulate seen in aircraft cargo bays, the minimum sensitivity 
requirements are also typically somewhat higher than residential detectors. 
Whereas the design goal for residential systems was providing adequate egress time and not necessarily structural 
protection, aviation systems assumed that while immediate egress was not feasible, false alarms are very costly and 
aggressive suppression of fires in cargo bays was possible. Consequently, the minimum sensitivities for both these 
systems were somewhat higher than spacecraft systems where the emphasis is on early detection (Table 1). Higher 
sensitivity levels for terrestrial systems are consistent with the fact that the smoke from a fire rises rapidly and remains 
very concentrated near the ceiling so it is possible to trigger at a higher level even though the overall amount of smoke 
produced is relatively small.  However, in spacecraft, the smoke is typically well mixed throughout the volume and 
thereby diluted so detection requires a greater amount of smoke release for a given volume [7]. 
The Space Shuttle smoke detector was an ionization detector based on the prevailing technology at the time. The 
sensitivity was higher than typical for residential systems due to the desire for rapid fire detection. The International 
Space Station (ISS) smoke detector is a forward light scattering system and is calibrated to alarm at 1% 
obscuration/foot for punk/smolder smoke. 
System Detector Performance Basis Technology 
Residential Minimum Sensitivity 1.6 to 13.2 % 
obscuration/m plus test fires  
Light Scattering or Ionization 
FAA Cargo 
Bay 
Emphasis on sampling the cargo area and 
false alarm avoidance, typical range is up to 
13.2 % obscuration/m 
Predominantly Light Scattering 
Space Shuttle 2 mg/m3 [8] Ionization 
ISS 3.3 % obscuration/m [8] Light Scattering 
Orion Current concept is rate of rise detection (light 
scattering) 
Light Scattering 
Table 1:  Detector Performance Requirements for Terrestrial and Spacecraft Systems 
 The Smoke Aerosol Measurement Experiment (SAME) examined the particle size distribution for the pyrolysis of 
several materials relevant [9] to spacecraft fires. An extract of the results is shown in Table 2. The particle size 
distribution was a strong function of the overheated material composition; the flow conditions; gravity level; how long 
the smoke aged at high concentration, and the heating rate. Given the change in size due to the other parameters, the 
influence of gravity was not the dominant cause of size variation. This important result enabled the future use of 
ground-based testing to establish the bulk of the design data for smoke detection. In the SAME results, the overall size 
variation was very significant. In particular, plastics such as Teflon and Kapton produced very small particles (100-
250 nm diameter of average mass) which are more challenging to detect with light scattering systems whereas silicone 
rubber and cellulose (representing paper and clothing) produced substantially larger particles (250- 620 nm diameter 
of average mass). The current detection methods (ionization and light scattering) both show increased signal with 
increasing particle size with the increase roughly linear for ionization (Space Shuttle) and to the third power for light 
scattering (ISS). This sensitivity to size change and the broad variation in smoke particle size (a factor of 6) coupled 
with a potentially widely varying background aerosol (e.g. dust) all contribute to challenging detector design criteria. 
The challenge lies not in detecting the smallest particles but rather in detecting them without making the detector so 
sensitive to larger particles that the false alarm rate is unacceptable. 
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Table 2:  Particle Size Results from the SAME Experiment [8] 
 Smoke detector implementation requires the ability to predict the smoke concentration for the anticipated fire 
risks. Spacecraft smoke signature data were reported in [10, 11] where spacecraft polymers were individually heated 
in a furnace that was enclosed in a larger chamber. This resultant atmosphere was analyzed for the concentrations of 
HF, HCl, CO2, CO, HCN and aerosol particles. An extract of the results were used to produce Table 3.  These results 
were scaled to the net species concentrations if the material produced an aerosol concentration of 10 mg/m3 in a 10 
m3 vehicle. These results are used in the subsequent analysis in this paper. The results clearly show that certain 
materials (e.g. Kapton, Teflon and PVC (polyvinyl chloride)) produce substantial quantities of hazardous gases.  
Kapton and Teflon are common in spacecraft due to their electrical properties and their low flammability. PVC is 
less common in vehicle systems but is likely to be present in Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) devices. Using these 
results this paper demonstrates that, while the amount of hazardous products as a function of the mass of material that 
is overheated is very important, it is also essential to consider the relative concentration of hazardous gaseous species 
and the smoke concentration if you are using a smoke detector to detect overheat events. 
Material 
Mass of pyrolyzed 
material required to 
reach alarm level smoke 
concentrations  (g) 
Species Concentration increase due to overheat event 
in a 10 m3 vehicle (ppm) 
CO HF HCN HCl CO2 
Kapton snips 6.7 256 0.4 5.7 0.4 263 
Bulk Teflon 53.7 104. 382 3.5 66. 2090 
Orange PVC wire 0.89 2.2 0.1 0.1 12.8 42.1 
Printed Circuit 
Board 
2.25 9.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 44.6 
Components 0.65 3.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.6 
Lamp wick 1.34 24.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 26.3 
Nomex 1.32 47.8 0.2 0.5 0.2 170.0 
Pyrell 0.40 4.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 15.6 
Bulk Kapton 16.81 931 1.1 13.1 1.1 1420 
Table 3:  Hazardous Species Results from [11], Scaled to a 10 m3 Spacecraft Volume 
(Scaled to a 10 m3 vehicle with an aerosol concentration at 10 mg/m3) 
Geometric Mean 
Diameter (Dg) 
(µm)  
Count Mean 
Diameter 
(M1/M0) 
(µm) 
Diameter of Average 
Mass 
(M3/M0) 
(µm)   
σg 
Kapton 
Unaged 0.042 0.056 0.101 2.154 
Aged 720 s 0.089 0.109 0.161 1.872 
Lampwick 
Unaged 0.090 0.128 0.258 2.312 
Aged 720 s 0.229 0.276 0.398 1.834 
Silicone 
Unaged 0.128 0.196 0.465 2.530 
Aged 720 s 0.269 0.355 0.619 2.108 
Teflon 
Unaged 0.081 0.101 0.170 2.198 
Aged 720 s 0.070 0.105 0.232 2.442 
Pyrell 
Unaged 0.149 0.204 0.384 2.211 
Aged 720 s 0.293 0.359 0.539 1.892 
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II. Analysis
The objective of this analysis is to estimate the amount of material that must be pyrolyzed to trigger the smoke 
detector for typical spacecraft configurations. The parameters being considered were the spacecraft habitable volume, 
the air circulation and filtration rate and the smoke detector sensitivity. This is not necessarily a straightforward 
calculation because in many spacecraft the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) includes High 
Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration which removes virtually all of the smoke particles. Given the existence 
of HEPA filtration systems, a relatively higher total amount of smoke must be released to achieve alarm for a given 
smoke release rate. Once the total amount of smoke release has been estimated, the amount of hazardous gaseous 
species released can be estimated using Table 3 assuming no removal of these species by the filtration system. This 
assumption is probably unrealistic for HF which is recognized to have an affinity for surfaces, especially glass 
materials such as the fibers in a HEPA filter. For CO and HCN this assumption is more reasonable.  
Quantification of the absorption of these species to spacecraft materials is the object of an ongoing study. For this 
analysis, we identified representative scenarios based on consideration of the Space Shuttle, the ISS Destiny module, 
Nodes 1 and 2 of the ISS, and representative numbers for Orion and the anticipated commercial crew vehicles. Many 
smoke detector alarm settings are based on percent of light extinction, however, conversion from this metric to smoke 
particle mass concentration (mg/m3) is not straightforward and corresponding empirical data are not available in the 
literature. For this purpose, the work of Bukowski and Mulholland [1] is used to estimate the conversion. Another 
important issue not considered in this work is that the majority of detectors used in current or anticipated spacecraft 
are light scattering devices. The light scattering signal is roughly proportional to the third power of the particle 
diameter. Table 2 shows that the particle sizes of smoke from spacecraft materials varies by a factor of approximately 
6. This substantially influences the concentration at which the smoke alarm is triggered for different materials. Two
materials of particular interest (Teflon and Kapton) have smaller particles which are harder to detect with a light 
scattering sensor [9] requiring more smoke to trigger the alarm, consequently the smoke particle concentration at alarm 
can be expected to be higher with concomitant increases in hazardous gaseous species. 
The configurations under consideration can be broken into 2 groups: flowing systems and mixed systems. In 
flowing systems, the smoke is released in a duct-like configuration where there is relatively little axial mixing between 
the source and the detector and the plug flow approximation is reasonable. Calculation of the smoke concentration 
needed to alarm is a simple matter of calculating the amount of smoke particulate needed to bring the volume flow to 
the alarm concentration for a period long enough to trigger the alarm. For this work we assumed that a 20-second 
pulse of smoke was necessary to trigger the alarms. 
The mixed model is a stirred or lumped model that considers release of the smoke into a well-mixed volume where 
the ventilation system circulates the air. This ventilation system may or may not filter the particles from the air. In this 
configuration, the smoke is released slowly enough that the volume is fully mixed. Brooker et al [7] shows that at 
slow release rates the smoke mixes thoroughly in typical spacecraft so the entire vehicle volume needs to rise to the 
detection concentration before the alarm will trigger. At very high release rates, given the turbulent flow in most 
spacecraft cabins, a high concentration streamline may pass by the detector before the average concentration has risen 
to the alarm level but this is not a reliable transport mechanism on which to base a detection system. The mixed volume 
model treats a spacecraft as consisting of two volumes (II and III) with a fire (volume I) occurring in either or both 
volumes as shown in figure 1. The ECLSS ventilation system then moves the air from volume II to volume III 
providing a specified level of filtration. The same volume of air flows back from volume III to maintain continuity 
(Figure 1). This design enables modeling of vehicles that contain 2 interconnected volumes. Reducing one volume in 
the model to a negligible size enables simulation of a vehicle with a single volume. 
Since volume I (the fire) is entirely enclosed in volume III, the model can be represented by conservation equations 
for volumes II and III as shown in equations 1 and 2. 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑋𝑖,𝐼𝐼 =  ?̇?𝑖,𝐼𝐼 +
?̇?𝐸𝐶𝐿𝑆𝑆
𝑉𝐼𝐼
𝑋𝑖,𝐼𝐼𝐼 −
?̇?𝐸𝐶𝐿𝑆𝑆
𝑉𝐼𝐼
𝑋𝑖,𝐼𝐼 (1) 
Equation 1 expresses the net change of species concentration (mole fraction) or particulate number density in the 
volume II as a result of a fire. The first term on the right hand side represents the species generation by the fire; the 
second term is the transport of species from volume III to volume II; and the third term is the transport of species from 
volume II to volume III.  
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𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝑋𝑖,𝐼𝐼𝐼 =  ?̇?𝑖,𝐼𝐼𝐼 + (1 − 𝛼𝑖)
?̇?𝐸𝐶𝐿𝑆𝑆
𝑉𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑋𝑖,𝐼𝐼 −
?̇?𝐸𝐶𝐿𝑆𝑆
𝑉𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑋𝑖,𝐼𝐼𝐼 (2) 
This expression represents the net change of species (mole fraction) in the main volume III as a result of a fire. 
The first term on the right hand side represents the species generation by the fire, the second term is the species 
transport from volume II to volume III through the ECLSS system (with filtering with efficiency αi); and the third 
term is the transport of species from volume III to volume II. 
The particulate transport equations are almost identical to equations 1 and 2 with the species mole fraction replaced 
by the particulate number density and the generation term in each equation replaced by the particulate generation rate. 
We modify this model to consider an arbitrary space vehicle with a large open volume (III). The ECLSS ventilation 
system cycles air from a small volume II through a filter and back into volume III. Volume II is small and the results 
for particulate loading that follow are for volume III. 
A. Flowing Systems 
In the Space Shuttle fleet, the avionics bays were cooled by cabin air drawn into the front face of the avionics 
units. This air was combined with the air from other avionics devices and the return air in the cabin air assembly and 
then passed over an ionization type smoke detector. The flow in the duct was approximately 9000 lpm. Table 4 shows 
the mass of pyrolyzed material necessary to trigger an alarm assuming it requires a 20-second pulse of smoke at the 
threshold concentration for that vehicle mixed in the air flow in column 1. Table 4 also shows the worst case 
concentration of hazardous species using the results in Table 3. Notable results are that: choice of detector sensitivity 
has a big effect on the results, very small amounts of pyrolyzed PVC will trigger an alarm whereas much larger 
amounts of wire insulation must pyrolyze to trigger the alarm. The species concentration in the duct are quite high but 
since this is a transient pulse that will be diluted in the vehicle, this is not of particular concern. 
Figure 1: Schematic of the mixed volume model showing the location of the fire zone and the filtration system. 
For the purposes of this paper, all systems were modeled as single compartments by reducing one volume (e.g. 
Volume III) to insignificant size. The filtration flow rate is set as a parameter and the return rate matches by 
continuity. 
Volume II (mixed) 
Volume III (mixed) 
Volume I: Fire 
Volume 
Variable 
Filtration 
ECLSS Flow 
Return flow 
(same as ECLSS 
flow) 
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Avionics Cooling 
duct STS Alarm 
level 
9000 2 65.0 0.1 1.0 3.2 0.1 0.1 186 77 3 3 
417 
 
Avionics Cooling 
duct ISS Alarm 
level 
9000 10 65.0 0.4 5.0 15.9 0.3 0.4 931 383 13 13 2087 
Table 4: Estimates of the mass of material that must be pyrolyzed to trigger the alarm in a Space Shuttle avionics 
cooling air return using a Space Shuttle Detector or an ISS detector. The concentration of hazardous products in the 
duct are also estimated for several materials. 
 
B. Mixed Systems 
The mixed model simulates smoke release in three systems: 1. the ISS Destiny module based on the flows reported 
in [7]; 2. the Space Shuttle flight deck; and 3. the crew cabin of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). Table 5 
summarizes the parameters in the model along with tabular results. These cases serve as representative of a class of 
vehicle and may not precisely match the exact flow rates of the vehicle. The CEV numbers are likely representative 
of commercial crew vehicles. One important parameter to consider is the rate of HEPA filtration of the air. The Shuttle 
had no HEPA filtration while the ISS and the CEV, like other new capsule designs, have HEPA filtration combined 
with high air flow rates. The net result is that the smoke generation rate needs to exceed the particle removal rate by 
filtration to achieve a detectable concentration. For simplicity, the model considered only the case of cellulose 
(Lampwick) pyrolysis and then the results were scaled to consider other materials using the values in Table 3. We 
attempted to estimate the habitable volume rather than the total pressurized volume since much of the pressurized 
volume will not communicate with the cabin air on a constant basis. This difference will affect the total smoke mass 
release needed to trigger the alarm and will affect the detection times but will not strongly affect the gas species 
concentrations. Figure 2 displays the results for the Space Shuttle. Notably, since there is no HEPA filtration, the 
aerosol concentration is only dependent on the total mass pyrolyzed and not the pyrolysis rate. This analysis assumes 
that the flow is well mixed and consequently the entire volume needs to rise to the alarm threshold. This assumption 
is valid for a slow release of the smoke, but does not consider the fact that at very high smoke release rates, a high 
concentration streamline of smoke may pass over the detector and trigger the alarm. Given the sensitivity of the flow 
to local positions of people and stowage, the only reliably conservative prediction of alarm thresholds must be based 
on complete mixing. This mixing is one of the challenges of smoke detection in low-gravity compared to terrestrial 
systems where the smoke can be assumed to be concentrated near the ceiling. 
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 m3 m3/h % mg/m3 mg/s g g g g ppm ppm ppm ppm ppm 
Destiny 53 1100 100 10 140.5 7.9 98.4 314.0 5.2 1027 422 14 14 2304 
Space Shuttle 37 521 0 2 NA 1.0 12.4 39.7 0.7 186 76 3 3 417 
CEV / 
Commercial 
Crew Capsules 
6 500 100 10 28.1 0.9 11.8 37.7 0.6 1089 448 15 15 2442 
 
Table 5: Mass pyrolysis needed to trigger the smoke detector in a well-mixed system and resultant concentrations 
of hazardous gases and aerosols based on the results in Figures 2, 3, 4 and Table 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the results for the ISS Destiny Module, neglecting the mixing of air with other modules. This 
intermodule ventilation will only extend the detection times and potentially increase the total release of smoke 
products. The notable difference from the Space Shuttle is that all of the air on the ISS passes through a HEPA filter. 
Figure 2: Peak Particulate Mass Density on the Space Shuttle as a 
function of the total mass of smoke particulate for 3 different burning 
rates. Owing to the absence of HEPA filtration, only the total 
particulate mass release is important, not the rate of release. The 
detection limit is 2mg/m3. 
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Even though the smoke detectors are in front of the filters, for low smoke release rates, the filtration keeps ahead of 
the smoke generation. Detection times also increase because the ISS detection limit is higher than the Space Shuttle.  
Table 5 documents the impact this has on the gas species concentrations. For each vehicle, Table 5 used the first 
trace in figures 3 and 4 that crossed the alarm threshold (140.5 mg/s for Destiny and 28.1 mg/s for CEV). From this 
the total mass of smoke particulate needed to trigger the alarm was determined.  Using this number and scaling the 
results in table 3 for the appropriate vehicle volume, the mass of each material that would need to be pyrolyzed to 
trigger the alarm was estimated and is shown in table 5.  Table 3 [11] was used to estimate the concentration of 
hazardous gaseous products that would result from the pyrolysis of the stated mass of each material. The worst-case 
concentrations are shown in table 5 with the specific materials that produced those concentrations identified in the 
column titles. The required masses of pyrolyzed material are substantially higher than in the Space Shuttle despite the 
roughly comparable volumes. This is due to both the effect of the HEPA Filtration and the smoke alarm threshold. 
The results for the Crew Exploration Vehicle in Figure 4 are similar with the exception that it reaches the alarm 
threshold at a lower mass of smoke released. This is not surprising given the much smaller size compared to Destiny. 
Despite the smaller mass needed to trigger the alarm, the hazardous gas species concentration are quite high, owing 
to the rapid air exchange rate with complete filtration. 
These results suggest that hazardous gas species could accumulate to dangerous levels before a smoke alarm is 
triggered. One potential approach is to reduce the particle filtration rate to a level that is slow compared to the expected 
generation rate in a fire but is still higher than the expected baseline generation rate. An alternative approach would 
be to take advantage of one of these species for detection. Examining table 3 suggests CO as a good alternative. It is 
relatively easy to detect and has a low baseline presence on spacecraft. CO is present in significant quantity for most 
of the materials that produce hazardous products except PVC. Further examination of the gas species and particulate 
production from pyrolysis of spacecraft materials is warranted to validate this result.    
Figure 4: Peak Particulate Mass Concentration in the CEV 
as a function of the total mass of smoke particulate for 3 
different burning rates. The burning rate is proportional to 
the smoke release rate and has a strong effect on the time 
required to reach the CEV detection limit (10 mg/m3). The 
total mass of smoke particulate at the alarm threshold for 
detection is 55 mg at 140.5 mg/s and 70.3 mg at 28.1 mg/s. 
Figure 3: Peak Particulate Mass Concentration in the ISS 
Destiny module as a function of the total mass of smoke 
particulate for 4 different burning rates. The burning rate is 
proportional to the smoke release rate and has a strong 
effect on the time required to reach the ISS detection limit 
(10 mg/m3). The total mass of smoke particulate at the 
alarm threshold for detection is 565 mg at 281mg/s and 586 
mg at 140.5 mg/s. 
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III. Conclusion
These results strongly suggest that spacecraft fire detection thresholds should not be based on terrestrial levels or 
on other spacecraft, but instead, need to be specifically selected based on the volume of the vehicle and the anticipated 
life support (air filtration and ventilation) systems. The interaction between all relevant systems must be considered 
to ensure adequate detection. This issue may be ameliorated by different detection strategies, i.e. looking at additional 
signals like CO concentration or by reducing the filtration rate to enable detection. Further validation of the smoke 
species signature results used to generate this analysis and the potential loss mechanisms for the hazardous species is 
essential to further resolve these issues. 
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